The objective of the following article is to give the reader a perspective on the events of 
Introduction
Recently, the author had the opportunity to spend lunch with a group of historians during the lunch break of a conference. Given that it is the 60th anniversary of the Revolution of 1956 this year, the topic of what happened then was an unavoidable subject of the discussion. However, sitting with scholars who have studied said subject extensively, it was an interesting experience to realise just how difficult it is for us to define exactly what had taken place 60 years ago. Was it war? Was it a civil conflict with a Russian intervention? And when does a mass protest without a central leadership become a revolution? It is a difficult task to define from a counterinsurgency theoretical standpoint what happened in those October weeks of 1956. On the one hand there is a lack of clear definitions for such basic types of events as revolutions, civil wars, etc.
In this article, the author will first offer a chronological overview of the key events, which are important to take into account in classifying what happened. In the second part of the article the author will introduce the currently available definitions for the categories mentioned above in order to arrive at a clearer view of the problems. In the third section, the author will conclude with some thoughts on how it may be possible to view the events of 1956 from a theoretical standpoint.
The Events
It was not the first time the Soviet Bloc was rocked by protests unanticipated. Shortly before the Hungarian events, a wave of demonstrations took place in Poland. Before that, East Germany was rocked by violent street protests in 1953. Because of the historical background in the Polish case, and the death of Stalin in the East German case these outbursts against Soviet domination were at least not really surprising in hindsight. In Hungary, however, which was until then considered a stable regime, the mass protests for reforms were completely unexpected. Another major difference was how the Hungarian and Soviet authorities tried to handle the situation in the unique setting of the situation in the wake of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the deStalinisation announced there. Also unprecedented was how rapidly a(n up to that point) seemingly stable communist regime first crumbled, and eventually quickly collapsed under its own failures and under the pressure of its own citizenry. As we can see from this short chronological overview, there are many important elements which need to be considered, when thinking about the nature of the conflict. On the political side, these are: inner party conflicts, the resentment of the population against the HWP leadership because of failed policies, resentment against outside interference, and, finally, the act by the Imre Nagy Government of openly breaking with the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact, and the declaration of neutrality. On the military side, it is important to note that the groups involved in the fighting on the Hungarian side were mostly volunteers, and that the size and the level of organisation of the groups concerned varied greatly. As already stated, conventional formations of the Hungarian People's Army did not take part in the fighting -some of the soldiers and army officers did nevertheless join the armed groups. The Hungarian State Protection Authority (SPA) remained the only force which unequivocally and actively defended the old system, while parts of the police and the military also remained loyal to the "old order." However, the bulk of the fighting was done by Soviet troops.
Some basic observations regarding the theorisation of the events
The quest for defining what happened in 1956 started immediately. The Gerő leadership labelled the event a "counter-revolution" and the Soviets shared this view. On the Hungarian side opposed to the old order, the events were called a "revolution," and later the term "freedom fight" also appeared in the description of the events. These are, however, politically charged attempts to capture what happened, with an intent to justify the actions of the respective sides and to claim legitimacy therefore. For this reason it is important to categorise the events according to universal definitions that are in use at the present.
The protestors, a part of whom became street fighters of the urban battle that followed, came from politically very different backgrounds, and they could not formulate a unified long-term political vision (the events unfolded so fast that this would have been simply impossible). The support of the reformist Nagy Government became a common point for these groups. Though they supported the new government, they were not statesanctioned, and they disregarded the orders not to resist the Soviet troops. It can thus be stated that on the Hungarian side loosely organised armed groups were fighting for a reformist government which they helped come to power through street protests, even as they were not under the direct command of this government.
On the Soviet side, the cause of the intervention is clear from a political point of view (they did not want to lose Hungary as a part of their sphere of influence). However, in order to achieve this aim, the Soviet leadership had to rely on a very shaky legal justification, and also had to suffer surprising setbacks on the military side.
Although the Soviet Union had by this point in time faced several conflicts where it was confronted with non-state armed groups in an urban environment, Soviet troops were not prepared adequately for the kind of combat they had to engage in. This is no surprise considering that the earlier conflicts where Soviet forces engaged in counterinsurgency were fought without the participation of the regular army, mainly by organisations such as the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) and later the KGB (the Soviet state security service from 1954 to 1991), the GUBB (Chief Directorate for the Struggle against Banditry) and the police. Indeed, the Red Army was barred early on in its history from fighting insurgent forces (Statiev, 2010: 7) . This therefore constitutes an important part of the explanation for the poor results from the Soviet point of view at the beginning of the fighting. Also, the Soviet units were mostly armored forces unsuited for the type of urban combat which awaited them in Budapest.
Making the picture more complicated is the fact that Soviet troops joined the battle shortly after the first instances of violent encounters. At first they were asked by the Hungarian governing authorities to intervene, but after the formation of the Nagy Europe and Voice of America, going as far as stating that these radio channels were actively directing the actions of the armed groups. What is true is -as Richard Schultz writes -that the aim of U.S. "psywar" efforts at the time was liberation through encouraging opposition, and the programming of the two stations was managed accordingly. This nourished false hopes of Western intervention on the part of otherwise undirected insurgents (Schultz, 2000: 164-165) .
Finding the Relevant Definitions for the Events
Although intra-state conflicts were on the rise in the 20th century, and are a very relevant factor of today's international system, their appropriate theorisation was neglected for most of the 20th century. This is a difficult challenge, as in the case of intra-state armed conflicts political, economic, information and military dimensions cut across each other to form a theoretical and practical field of study, where no easy answers are usually found.
But it must also be stated that scholarship on these issues made great leaps, leaving behind the concept of "small" wars (as opposed to "big" or -in the perspective of some -"real" wars fought against "peers" or "near peers", or by states against states in other words), thus creating the grounds for new theoretical concepts for classifying and interpreting conflicts.
Resistance. The most basic notion with which one can operate in this field is the one of resistance. Resistance can be broadly defined and has several variants (it may suffice to mention the most basic classification: violent and non-violent resistance). The U.S. Army defines a resistance movement as "An organised effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability" (JP 1-02, 2016:203) .
Using this definition one can argue that the short period before the 22nd of October and the first few hours of the 23rd can be considered as the formation of a nonviolent resistance movement, which intended to force some changes in policies through demonstrations. However, the events overtook this approach quite quickly. We can thus conclude that what happened was neither an unorganised nor an organised form of resistance.
Insurgency. The last decade brought a revival to the field of research dealing with insurgencies. There are, however, a number of definitions concentrating on different aspects of this type of conflict.
The U.S. Army defines insurgency today as "The organised use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region" (JP 1-02, 2016: 113) .
This definition may be in need of some clarification, as the definition of "subversion" is also problematic. According to the U.S. Army's Joint Publication 1-02 subversion is defined as "Actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority" (JP 1-02, 2016: 228) .
It is difficult to tell if there was a subversive approach at the time of the first protests. According to the definition above, peaceful protests may also be understood as subversive activity insofar as they aim to "undermine the political strength or morale of the governing authority." The protests were orchestrated by civil groups in order to achieve political aims. However, these were at first not openly challenging the governing authority. Against this speaks the fact that subversion is usually part of a more complex approach used by a clandestine group. In the Hungarian case there is no evidence of such a background to the events.
As already stated, the violence was initiated by the state, not by non-state actors.
It is thus safe to say that the first violent actions on the part of non-state actors were a reaction to the approach of the security authorities. Also, at first the violence was unorganised from the non-state side. The lack of organisation was not only a distinctive trait of the use of violence, but it was also manifest in the ever more radical political demands of the different groups involved. It may be said that the protestors were in agreement only regarding the need for change. What came next was either open to discussion, or it was connected to differing visions of the future of Hungary.
Bard O'Neill, in his seminal book on Insurgency and Terrorism uses a wider definition for insurgency: "Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities, in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organisational expertise, propaganda and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics" (O'Neill, 2005: 15) . This definition places the organised use of different "political resources" at the center of the definition. As already stated, one cannot speak of an organised approach in the political sense in the case at hand. Also, there was a great variety of demands, on a broad spectrum. The most important and most common were the exit of Soviet troops from Hungary and a change in the composition of the leadership -at that point, however, demands have not included a change of the system. So it is debatable if political action targeted the legitimacy of the system as a whole. Revolution. In Gurr's view, a revolution is "fundamental sociopolitical change accomplished through violence" (Gurr, 1971: 4) . It is impossible to know how fundamental the changes brought by a Nagy Government would have been, had it had the chance to stay in position. However, for the first few days, the "revolution" framework may well apply to the events: the protests started a process of radical change in the Hungarian Workers' Party, at the end of which the Nagy Government declared itself willing to get out of the Warsaw Pact and also declared the neutrality of the country. Also, the initiation of violence was originated not by non-state actors, but by the state itself, through its oppressive measures, which is an important factor with a view to classification as a revolution. should be defined as "armed combat within the boundaries of a recognised sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities" (Kalyvas, 2009: 17) . This definition places emphasis on the territory where the fighting is taking place and the common authority to which each party taking part in the fighting belong at the start. As for the territory, the fighting was confined to within the borders of Hungary. However, it is difficult to clarify what "common authority" means in this case, regarding the Soviet forces. Using this definition, one could argue that the events of the first days, until the Nagy Government came to power, constituted a civil war, in which Soviet troops took part as an ally of the official Hungarian governing authorities. Within days, with the consolidation of the Nagy Government, the conflict transformed into a conflict between the Soviet Union and Hungary, and the usage of the term "civil war" would be misleading for this conflict, considering that nowadays the term is applied to long-running internal conflicts rather (even as these often take place with significant external involvement).
Conclusion
The events of October and November are difficult to categorise. The aspects, because of which this undertaking is made difficult are plenty: the chaotic manner in which the events unfolded, the shortness of time, the status of Soviet forces, the role of other outside forces, etc. Accordingly, most of the current definitions are in themselves not enough to describe what has taken place. Therefore it is useful for definitional purposes to interpret the course of events in two distinct stages. Firstly, the political protests and the ensuing violence, which helped Imre Nagy into power. Secondly, the fight of the Nagy Government and its supporters against the Soviet role in Hungary.
It is regarding the first stage that we have the arguably easier task. Using Gurr's definition, we can state that the events were indeed revolutionary in nature: the movement born on the 23rd of October was indeed a remarkable socio-political transformation in Hungarian political affairs.
This success was so fundamental, the swiftness with which the old order crumbled and gave way to the new, reform-minded leadership, that according to Mitrokhin's account, Yuri Andropov, the Soviet ambassador at the time in Budapest, became infected with a "Hungarian complex." As chairman of the KGB and as the leader of the Soviet Union, he later on actively sought to prevent any possible recurrence of similar events anywhere in the Soviet Bloc (Andrew and Mitrokhin, 2000: 7) .
Regarding the second stage of the events, the task of definition is much more difficult. Soviet troops were stationed in Hungary in the framework of the Warsaw Pact, and were asked by the Hungarian leadership to join the fight against armed (but, in reality, probably unarmed) protestors. Subsequently, the Soviet role transformed quickly from supporting Hungarian forces against armed groups to fighting against the new Hungarian government, which was nominally an ally of the Soviet Union. Making things more complicated, the Nagy Government encouraged a peaceful solution and discouraged fighting against Soviet forces. It was using János Kádár as a legitimizing figure that the Soviet leadership attempted to portray its actions internationally as legitimate, further complicating a classification of what they were doing.
In the end, based on a false pretext, they used conventional military forces and tactics to break all organised armed opposition in the country, but left the political complexities for the new Hungarian leadership to manage. The Nagy Government, in the meantime, discouraged armed opposition, but went for a complete political break with Moscow.
It is thus difficult to define the Soviet actions from the Hungarian point of view:
was it a case of armed interference in Hungarian domestic affairs, or was it more? In conclusion, it is safe to say that the complexity of the events of 1956 defies attempts at a simple definition of what happened.
